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Alimony Considerations Under
No-Fault Divorce Laws
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a trend toward the adoption
of no-fault divorce laws. Many states have amended their stat-
utes by abolishing the traditional grounds for divorce such as
adultery and cruelty, and adopting the standard of an irretriev-
ably broken marriage. A no-fault standard was employed in the
recent revision of Nebraska's divorce laws.'
The statutory changes reflect society's more liberal attitude
toward divorce. When a marriage reaches the point of divorce, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to place the fault on one party
alone. Although major changes occur when no-fault divorce
laws are adopted by a state, there is still a question whether
alimony should be awarded on a no-fault basis. The enactment
of a no-fault divorce law does not automatically result in the
abolition of fault as a consideration in the decision to award
alimony. A state-by-state analysis is useful in determining
whether alimony should be awarded on a no-fault basis. Factors
to be examined are legislative intent, the statutes enacted, and
the judicial interpretation of those statutes.
This comment examines policy considerations involved in
alimony and no-fault principles. The alimony laws of other
states, including Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Florida, Kentucky,
California, Arizona, and Colorado, will be reviewed to deter-
mine what effect the no-fault divorce law has had on alimony in
Nebraska. These states were chosen because their alimony laws
represent a broad spectrum, ranging from states in which
alimony is awarded based on fault to states in which fault is not
a consideration. This overview will provide some insight into
whether or not Nebraska should incorporate a fault standard
into its alimony statute.2
The final part of this comment will focus on cases decided
1. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-361 (Reissue 1974) (superseding Law of April 12, 1945,
ch. 101, 1945 Neb. Laws 329-30 (repealed 1972).
2. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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under prior Nebraska law to ascertain previous guidelines for
awarding alimony. Cases decided under the new law will then
be examined to determine whether the guidelines have been
changed with the enactment of the new statute.'
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Various rationales have been proposed for alimony and di-
vorce. Although the chief purpose of divorce laws is to provide
an end to marriage so the parties are legally free to remarry,
they also determine when the state will recognize the termina-
tion of the marriage and furnish solutions to attendant prob-
lems.4 Alimony can either provide long-term protection for the
support of the wife5 where the marital property is insufficient
for this purpose or it can provide short-term relief until she can
become self-supporting.6 The following are among the specific
goals of alimony: (1) to prevent the wife from going on welfare,
(2) to accomplish the divorce with the least social and financial
disruption for both spouses, (3) to maintain the same standard
of living that was enjoyed during the marriage, (4) to support the
wife, and (5) to compensate the wife for her faithful service
during the marriage.7
The courts should, and generally do, consider certain factors
in determining the amount of the alimony award. First, the
wife's needs-including an assessment of her individual proper-
ty and income-should be considered. Her contribution to the
family and its assets is sometimes a factor, and she is often
compensated for the loss of earnings which resulted from mar-
riage cutting off or curtailing her career. Other factors to be
weighed include the husband's ability to pay, without undue
hardship, his debts, taxes, and expenses. 8 The husband should
be left with enough money after alimony payments to meet his
3. Id.
4. Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 402 (1971).
5. In the interest of simplicity, this comment is written from the perspective
that the wife will be awarded alimony. In many states, alimony can be
awarded to either the husband or the wife. However, statutes awarding
alimony only to a wife have not been held unconstitutional. See Williams v.
Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976); Saraceno .v. Saraceno, -Mass.-, 341
N.E.2d 261 (1976); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 535 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976). Where applicable, an award of alimony to the husband is based on
the same considerations as an award of alimony to the wife. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
6. R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 153 (Special Comm.
on Divorce, Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws 1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION].
7. Id. at 140-42.
8. Id. at 151.
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own expenses and maintain a standard of living similar to that
of the former wife.
The final element, which still enters into the alimony decision
in a number of states, is fault. The rationale for using fault as a
factor in alimony awards is cogently discussed in the dissent in
In re Marriage of Williams,9 a leading Iowa case. The issue
underlying the inclusion of a fault factor in alimony decisions is
whether a wife who is at fault in a marriage should be paid the
same amount of alimony as a wife who is not at fault, assuming
all other factors are equal. An equitable result may not be
achievable unless fault is considered. The following rationale
underlies the consideration of fault in awarding alimony: "If a
woman has been a tramp, why reward her? By the same token,
if a man is alley-catting around town, shouldn't his wife get all
the benefits she had as a married woman?"1 0
Perhaps a system in which fault is considered provides more
justice and equity than does a no-fault system. However, the
benefits of the no-fault system are that accusations of fault and
the lengthy fault finding process are eliminated. The accom-
panying hostility is also reduced. In deciding which system is
preferable, one must consider whether the possible benefits of
the no-fault system outweigh the possible sense of justice em-
bodied in a system which considers fault.
When fault is considered in the alimony award, there is usu-
ally a strong moral element involved. When the wife is con-
sidered to be at fault, she may receive little, if any, alimony." If
the husband is at fault, he may have to pay a greater sum in
alimony as compensation for certain wrongs, or as punish-
ment.12 Traditionally, the treatment of fault in awarding
alimony has varied. In some states, fault is a complete bar to
alimony. Other states examine the type of fault involved and
hold that only certain types of conduct, such as adultery, will be
a bar; other misconduct is simply a factor to be taken into
account. Finally, some states consider fault only in determining
the amount of the award, but not in determining whether
alimony should be awarded.
Alimony awards which consider fault only encourage suspi-
cion. If both parties want the marriage to end, the wife may
obtain more alimony if she can find evidence of the husband's
misconduct.13 Furthermore, such a system is inconsistent with
9. 199 N.W.2d 339, 349 (Iowa 1972) (Uhlenhopp, J., dissenting).
10. M. WHEELER, No FAULT DIVORCE 57 (1974) (quoting Eli Bronstein).
11. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 445-46 (1968).
12. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 6, at 149.
13. M. WHEELER, supra note 10, at 57.
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the goals underlying alimony because a person can receive a
financial gain for reasons that have no relation to his or her
situation.14 The trial judge's discretion is limited under the no-
fault system because evidence of fault is completely excluded.
The exclusion of evidence of fault also lessens the degree to
which the judge's personal prejudices may influence the
alimony award. This prejudice might operate to the detriment
of either party, depending on the judge, and should not be a
factor in alimony awards.
Each court must decide what factors it will consider in
alimony awards. The court must look at what has been included
in the state statute, what has been omitted from the statute,
legislative intent, and the overall purpose of alimony. Although
most courts consider factors similar to those outlined above,
each must decide what role fault will play in alimony awards.
III. THE DETERMINATION OF ALIMONY
AWARDS IN VARIOUS STATES
State statutes and decisions on alimony are far from uni-
form. In this section, various state laws and cases will be ex-
amined to identify the options available to the Nebraska
courts. 15
A. States Which Consider Fault to Some Degree
1. Maryland
Under the recently revised Maryland divorce statute,16 a di-
14. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 6, at 150. See id.
at 140-42.
15. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-347 to 379 (Reissue 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1977):
Upon a hearing of any bill for a divorce, the court may decree a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii for the following causes, to wit: first,
the impotence of either party at the time of the marriage; secondly,
for any cause which by the laws of this State, render a marriage
null and void ab initio; thirdly, for adultery; fourthly, when the
court shall be satisfied by competent testimony that the party com-
plained against has abandoned the party complaining, and that
such abandonment has continued uninterruptedly for at least
twelve months, and is deliberate and final, and the separation of
the parties beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation;
fifthly, when the husband and wife shall have voluntarily lived
separate and apart, without any cohabitation, for twelve consecu-
tive months prior to the filing of the bill of complaint, and such
separation is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation;
sixthly, when the party complained against has been convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor under the laws of this State or of any other
state in the United States, or the United States and has been sen-
tenced to serve at least three years or an indeterminate sentence in
796 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 3 (1978)
vorce will be granted on the basis of either fault or no-fault. The
no-fault grounds provide that a divorce will be granted if a
husband and wife voluntarily live separate and apart for one
year and there is no reasonable expectation of reconciliation, or
if they live apart for any reason for three years.17 These provi-
sions were added to the previous fault-based grounds for di-
vorce and the old law was not repealed. The change in the
statute merely added the two situations in which a divorce
would be granted on no-fault grounds.
The question left to the Maryland courts after this change in
the divorce statute was what effect it would have on alimony
awards. The statute states that alimony may be awarded when a
divorce is decreed 18 but the standards for deciding on the
amount of the award were left to be developed by the courts.
In a case which arose under the prior law, the Maryland
Court of Appeals stated:
It is a general rule that a court, before determining the amount of
alimony, should consider the maintenance of the wife in accordance
with the husband's duty to support her suitably, together with the
husband's wealth and earning capacity. In addition to the financial
circumstances of the parties, the court should also usually consider
their station in life, their age and physical condition, ability to work,
the length of time they lived together, the circumstances leading up to
the separation, the fault which destroyed the home, and their respec-
tive responsibilities for the care and support of the children. 19
Fault was a consideration in alimony awards, including fault
occurring botlh before and after the separation.20
There seems to be a paradox, however, in that even though
the Maryland courts considered the fault leading to the divorce,
they maintained that the alimony award was not a punitive
measure although the husband was found to be an adulterer.21 It
seems inconsistent to say that alimony is not to be used as a
punitive measure but that the husband's fault will be considered
in making the award. Although the award could be explained as
any penitentiary or penal institution 12 months of which sentence
has been served; seventhly, on the application of either party when
the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without any
cohabitation and without interruption for three years. A plea of res
adjudicata or of recrimination with respect to any other provisions
of this section shall not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce
on this seventh ground.
17. Id.
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (Supp. 1977) ("In cases where a divorce is
decreed, alimony may be awarded to either spouse.").
19. Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640, 642, 16 A.2d 918, 920 (1940) (emphasis
added).
20. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 594, 261 A.2d 452, 454 (1970).
21. Danziger v. Danziger, 208 Md. 469, 474, 118 A.2d 653, 656 (1955).
ALIMONY AND NO-FAULT DIVORCE
compensation to the wife for the husband's acts, it would still
appear to be punishment for the husband. Another way to inter-
pret the view that the alimony award was not punitive is to view
it from the perspective of the equities of the situation. If, for
example, the husband destroyed the marriage, it could be ar-
gued that this factor should be weighed in an equitable adjust-
ment so that the wife would not be harmed as a result of his
fault. Even using this reasoning, it is not altogether clear that no
element of punishment was involved.
With the advent of the new law, the Maryland court decided
that fault should still be considered a factor in alimony even
when the divorce followed the statutory separation period.22
The new statute states that alimony should be awarded only if
financial considerations warrant it. 23 The court recognized this
and the fact that alimony is not punitive, but held that fault
should be considered in determining the amount of the award.24
So the greater the wife's fault, the greater the need she must
show to be entitled to an appropriate amount of alimony. If the
fault which exists is the wife's adultery or abandonment, no
alimony will be awarded to her except where there are extreme
extenuating circumstances 25 because the legislature, in specify-
ing these acts as grounds for divorce, considered them the more
heinous reasons. Other misconduct will not be a bar to alimony
but will be considered a factor even though the divorce is ob-
tained on no-fault grounds. 26
If both parties are at fault in the divorce, then the fault of
each should be balanced in the alimony award.27 For example,
where the husband's adultery was found to be the fault which
destroyed the marriage but the wife committed adultery after
the separation, she was held to be entitled to alimony.28 Since
the wife was unable to work, the public policy of keeping her off
welfare was also considered by the court.29
22. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973).
23. AID. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 5 (Supp. 1977):
(a) In all cases where alimony or alimony pendente lite and
counsel fees are claimed, the court may not award alimony,
alimony pendente lite, or counsel fees unless it appears from the
evidence that the spouse's income is insufficient to care for his or
her needs.
24. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 339, 311 A.2d 407, 410 (1973).
25. Id. at 341, 311 A.2d at 411. See Rhoad v. Rhoad, 273 Md. 459, 465, 330 A.2d
192, 196 (1975); Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md. App. 620, 638, 339 A.2d 328, 340
(1975); Flood v. Flood, 24 Md. App. 395,399,330 A.2d 715,718 (1975); Renner
v. Renner, 16 Md. App. 143, 159, 294 A.2d 671, 680 (1972).
26. Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md. App. 620, 638, 339 A.2d 328, 340 (1975).
27. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 341-42, 311 A.2d 407, 411 (1973).
28. Flood v. Flood, 24 Md. App. 395, 400, 330 A.2d 715, 719 (1975).
29. Id. at 405, 330 A.2d at 721.
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Even though the Maryland statute includes no-fault provi-
sions and states that recrimination will not be a bar to a divorce
granted after a three-year separation,30 fault still plays a part in
alimony. The Maryland court felt justified in continuing to
weigh fault in alimony in a no-fault divorce because the legisla-
ture had simply added no-fault options to a predominately fault-
oriented system.3 1 The court interpreted legislative intent to in-
clude a desire to maintain fault considerations even though no-
fault provisions were also enacted. Alimony continues to be
based on the same factors whether the divorce is obtained on
fault or no-fault grounds. This system which allows for a con-
sideration of fault in awarding alimony will result in a great
deal of discretion on the part of the trial judge and will necessar-
ily be very subjective.
2. Florida
The Florida divorce law grants a couple a divorce if the
marriage is irretrievably broken or if one spouse is mentally
incompetent.32 The alimony statute states that adultery and any
other factors necessary to do equity and justice may be con-
sidered in the alimony award.33 Before the enactment of this
law, the Florida courts considered fault and reached equitable
decisions based on the facts.34 The statute makes economic equi-
ty a factor and provides for a distinction between rehabilitative
and permanent alimony. Rehabilitative alimony is provided to
help the wife re-establish herself and become self-supporting 35
while permanent alimony is awarded to a woman who is not
capable of supporting herself.36
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1977).
31. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 337-38, 311 A.2d 407, 408-09 (1973).
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West Supp. 1977).
33. Id. § 61.08:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may
grant alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative
or permanent in nature. In any award of alimony, the court may
order periodic payments or payments in lump sum or both. The
court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances
thereof in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to such
spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded to such
spouse.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony, the court may
consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the
parties.
34. Brunner v. Brunner, 159 Fla. 762, 32 So. 2d 736 (1947); Cowan v. Cowan, 147
Fla. 473, 2 So. 2d 869 (1941); Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 1 So. 2d 480
(1941); Mathews v. Mathews, 117 Fla. 60, 157 So. 195 (1934).
35. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Thigpen v. Thigpen,
277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
36. Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Sharpe v.
Sharpe, 267 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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Adultery was a complete bar to alimony under the old law.37
Under the new law, the Florida courts are unclear as to exactly
what consideration should be given adultery. One area of confu-
sion is whether consideration of the alimony-seeking spouse's
adultery is mandatory. One Florida case held that the court, in
its discretion, may refuse to hear evidence of adultery.38 A sub-
sequent case from the same court held that the court cannot
prevent the introduction of evidence of adultery, but the court
can assign any weight it desires to this evidence. 39 The two cases
do not provide a clear basis for distinction and commentators
have regarded them as being in conflict.40
There is also a conflict of authority as to whether the paying
spouse's, as well as the recipient spouse's, adultery can be con-
sidered. One line of cases holds that the adultery of both
spouses should be considered. 41 Such an inquiry can be made
within reasonable bounds so that an equitable financial ar-
rangement can be achieved.42 Since the legislature specified
that equity should be considered, perhaps adultery of both
spouses should be. a factor. The other line of cases holds that
only the adultery of the alimony-seeking spouse should be con-
sidered because of its interpretation of the statutory language:
"The court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the cir-
cumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be
awarded to such spouse .... ,,43
Although adultery is specifically mentioned in the statute as
a possible factor to be considered, there is no clear statement of
whether other misconduct should be considered in the alimony
award. There have been no decisions which explicitly hold that
fault may not be considered and one commentator asserts that
this question is still undecided." However, in Oliver v. Oliver,45
a Florida district court held that evidence of the wife's miscon-
duct should be a factor in determining alimony. The court held
that the language of the statute which allowed the court to
consider any factor needed to do equity should be read to in-
clude the misconduct of the parties. In Oliver, the misconduct
37. Cowan v. Cowan, 147 Fla. 473, 2 So. 2d 869 (1941).
38. Vandervoot v. Vandervoot, 265 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
39. Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
40. O'Flarity, Trends in No-Fault-No Responsibility Divorce, 49 FLA. B.J. 90,
93 (1975); Commentary, Alimony in Florida: No Fault Stops at the Court-
house Door, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 521, 529 (1976).
41. Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
42. McClelland v. McClelland, 318 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
43. Escobar v. Escobar, 300 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See also
Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So. 2d 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
44. Commentary, supra note 40, at 529.
45. 285 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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included the wife's intoxication and threats to kill the husband.
The fact that Oliver involved such extreme conduct was con-
sidered to be important in a recent case in which the court urged
that evidence of misconduct be limited to cases of gross miscon-
duct. The court acknowledged that misconduct could be con-
sidered but did so reluctantly because it did not want to regress
to an alimony system which considered fault as a factor.
46
Florida now stands in the position of being a no-fault divorce
state with a retained discretionary rule allowing inquiry into
conduct. The specific mention of adultery in the statute indi-
cates that it is at least to be considered, but it is unclear whether
the consideration is mandatory and what weight the adultery
should be given. Some Florida courts, however, do ignore fault
and reach a decision based on equitable factors.
3. Michigan
In Michigan, cases which were decided before the enactment
of the new divorce 47 and alimony48 statutes examined the cir-
cumstances of the parties, the sources of the marital property,
the contribution of each spouse towards acquisition, the length
of the marriage, the earning ability of each spouse, and the
cause of divorce in determining alimony.49 The new statute pro-
vides for no-fault divorce, but the alimony statute was left un-
changed. The statute did not specify that fault was to be elimi-
nated as a consideration in alimony awards. In interpreting this
provision, one Michigan court has held that the same factors are
46. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The
court's discussion of fault factors is dicta since the wife was not found to be
at fault.
47. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1977).
48. Id. § 552.23:
(1) Upon every divorce from the bond of matrimony and also
upon every divorce from bed and board if the estate and effects
awarded to either party shall be insufficient for the suitable sup-
port and maintenance of either party and such children of the
marriage as shall be committed to the care and custody of either
party, the court may further award to either party such part of the
real and personal estate of either party and such alimony out of the
estate real and personal, to be paid to either party in gross or
otherwise as it shall deem just and reasonable, having regard to the
ability of either party and the character and situation of the parties,
and all other circumstances of the case.
49. Sovereign v. Sovereign, 366 Mich. 681, 116 N.W.2d 46 (1962); Johnson v.
Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956); Whittaker v. Whittaker, 343
Mich. 267, 72 N.W.2d 207 (1955); Reitz v. Reitz, 338 Mich. 309, 61 N.W.2d 81
(1953); DeMay v. DeMay, 326 Mich. 72, 39 N.W.2d 248 (1949); Bialy v. Bialy,
167 Mich. 559, 133 N.W. 496 (1911).
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to be considered regardless of the change in the divorce stat-
ute.5
0
When the report to the legislature was made by the Michigan
Law Revision Commission, it recommended a no-fault divorce
statute and a revision of the alimony statute. The report suggest-
ed that the alimony statute be amended to read, "the court may
award such alimony ... as shall be fair and equitable under the
circumstances."'51 This language was not adopted. This lan-
guage would not have clearly resulted in the elimination of fault
from alimony, but the fact that the legislature did not change
the statute was interpreted as an intent to reject a modification
of the existing alimony laws. Under this interpretation of the
statute, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded it should
continue to consider fault in determining alimony.52
The Michigan statute specifically refers to alimony awards
which are just and reasonable, the ability and character of the
parties, and "all other circumstances of the case. '53 Using these
guidelines, the courts have considered several different factors,
but the emphasis given to each factor varied even under the
prior law. The contribution of each party to the assets of the
marriage was emphasized in several cases.54 Other cases have
focused on the wife's needs, the husband's duty to support, the
husband's ability to pay, and equity.55
Even though it is clear in Michigan that fault can be con-
sidered in awarding alimony, the courts often seem to ignore or
give little weight to this factor. This is true of cases which were
decided both before and after the enactment of the no-fault
divorce law. For example, Hollway v. HoIlwayM6 focused more
on the standard of living of the parties and the fact that they
both worked than on the husband's cruelty, a factor which was
given little weight.
In Hutchins v. Hutchins,57 the court discussed the causes to
50. Kretzschmor v. Kretzschmor, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973).
51. Id. at 288 n.3, 210 N.W.2d at 357 n.3.
52. Id. at 289, 210 N.W.2d at 357.
53. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23 (Supp. 1977).
54. Sovereign v. Sovereign, 366 Mich. 681, 116 N.W.2d 46 (1962); Whittaker v.
Whittaker, 343 Mich. 267, 72 N.W.2d 207 (1955); Pinney v. Pinney, 47 Mich.
App. 2-90, 209 N.W.2d 467 (1973); Czuhai v. Czuhai, 30 Mich. App. 208, 186
N.W.2d 32 (1971).
55. DeMay v. DeMay, 326 Mich. 72, 39 N.W.2d 248 (1949); Bialy v. Bialy, 167
Mich. 559, 133 N.W. 496 (1911); Van Ommen v. Van Ommen, 25 Mich. App.
652, 181 N.W.2d 634 (1970); Ross v. Ross, 24 Mich. App. 19, 179 N.W.2d 703
(1970).
56. 344 Mich. 304, 73 N.W.2d 833 (1955).
57. 36 Mich. App. 675, 194 N.W.2d 6 (1971).
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determine whether the divorce should have been granted, but it
is not clear whether fault was considered in deciding on the
division of property and alimony. The court seemed to attempt
to arrive at a fair division of the assets without taking fault into
account.
Adultery is no longer a complete bar to alimony under the
new law as it was under the old law,5 8 but if there is extensive
marital misconduct, it may result in a denial of alimony. In
reaching a decision on alimony, the length of the marriage and
the age of the parties is also considered.5 9
Most Michigan cases do not rely principally on fault, and
fault often is not considered expressly even though a poll of
judges showed that a majority believed that conduct and mari-
tal fault should be considered in awarding alimony.60 It is argu-
able that considering fault in alimony and not in divorce is
inconsistent but since fault is not a primary consideration,
perhaps the inconsistency is not as great. Even though fault can
be a consideration, the result may not be very different from
that achieved in a no-fault alimony state.
4. Kentucky
The Kentucky alimony statute61 specifically sets out the fac-
58. Feldman v. Feldman, 55 Mich. App. 147, 154, 222 N.W.2d 2, 6 (1974).
59. Id.
60. Snyder, Divorce Michigan Style-1972 and Beyond, 50 MICH. ST. B. J. 740,
744 (1971).
61. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Baldwin Supp. 1976):
Maintenance-Court may grant order for either spouse.
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion, or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of a
marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the
absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for either
spouse only if the court finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property ap-
portioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employ-
ment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circum-
stances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to
seek employment outside the home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for
such periods of time as the court deems just, and after considering
all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to
meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a pro-
vision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for
that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or train-
ing to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
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tors to be considered in deciding whether alimony should be
awarded and if so, in what amount. The court in Chapman v.
Chapman62 noted that the words "without regard to miscon-
duct" were deleted from the alimony statute before it was enact-
ed.6 3 The Kentucky alimony law is almost identical to the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act 64 but the Kentucky legislature
deleted the words referring to the amount of the alimony award.
The deletion of these words is a clear indication that the legisla-
ture expressly meant to vary from the no-fault principles of the
Uniform Act and retain fault as a consideration in alimony
awards.
Since the stated purpose of the law is to "mitigate the poten-
tial harm to the spouses and their children caused by the proc-
ess of legal dissolution of marriage, ' 65 this would seem to indi-
cate that fault should not be considered at all. If fault is not
considered, the spouses would not have to try to prove that the
other party was at fault and, as a result, at least some of the
hostility would be removed from the divorce and alimony pro-
ceedings. This would seem to fit into the statutory purpose of
mitigating the potential harm to the parties. However, the court
in Chapman held otherwise:
Fault is not to be considered in determining whether a spouse is
entitled to maintenance but it may be considered insofar as the
amount is concerned. There are so many elements entering into a
determination of what is a just amount, however, that we shall not
enumerate them. The Act itself names some of the elements but the
list is not exclusive. It is only after the chancellor has considered all
elements, including fault, that he can get the "feel" of a just award.66
An interpretation of the statute supports the court's rationale
in considering fault in determining the amount of alimony, but
not in the initial determination of whether or not to make the
award. The first section of the statute specifies that alimony
may be awarded only in narrowly defined eircumstances: when
the spouse does not have sufficient property to support herself
and is unable to work.67 There is no mention of fault, and it is
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought
to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking mainte-
nance.
62. 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973).
63. Id. at 137.
64. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE ACT § 308(b) (1970).
65. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (Baldwin Supp. 1976).
66. 498 S.W.2d at 138.
67. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.200(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1976).
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very doubtful that the wife's misconduct should cut her off
completely from an alimony award when she is in such dire
circumstances.
The second section of the statute deals with the determina-
tion of the amount of the award and states that alimony shall be
awarded in an amount that is just, considering all relevant fac-
tors.68 This section of the statute is more vague than the first
section. This vagueness, together with the fact that the words
"without regard to misconduct" were omitted from the section
dealing with the amount of the award, allows the court discre-
tion to decide whether and to what extent fault should be con-
sidered in determining the amount of the award. The two-tier
approach enables the Kentucky court to continue to use fault as
a criteria in determining the amount of alimony awards.
B. States Which Do Not Consider Fault
1. California
California's divorce 69 and alimony ° statutes are similar to
68. Id. § 403.200(2).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970): "A court may decree a dissolution of the
marriage or legal separation on either of the following grounds, which shall
be pleaded generally: (1) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage. (2) Incurable insanity."
70. Id. § 4801:
(a) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a marriage or
a legal separation of the parties, the court may order a party to pay
for the support of the other party any amount, and for such period
of time, as the court may deem just and reasonable. In making the
award, the court shall consider the following circumstances of the
respective parties:
(1) The earning capacity and needs of each spouse.
(2) The obligations and assets, including the separate property,
of each.
(3) The duration of the marriage.
(4) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful
employment without interfering with the interests of dependent
children in the custody of the spouse.
(5) The time required for the supported spouse to acquire ap-
propriate education, training and employment.
(6) The age and health of the parties.
(7) The standard of living of the parties.
(8) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable.
At the request of either party, the court shall make appropriate
findings with respect to the circumstances. The court may order
the party required to make such payment of support to give rea-
sonable security therefor. Any order for support of the other party
may be modified or revoked as the court may deem necessary,
except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of
the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify
or revoke. At the request of either party, the order of modification
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those of Kentucky71 and Michigan.72 The California alimony
statute does not mention fault, which has been eliminated as a
factor in divorce. The legislative history clearly indicated how
the statute should be interpreted:
The Family Law Act was unquestionably a product of extensive in-
quiry into the public policy considerations and practical conse-
quences of prior divorce law, which had been predicated primarily
upon concepts of fault or guilt. The California Assembly made specif-
ic reference to the issues of fault and guilt in commenting upon the
Family Law Act.
73
The legislative history indicated that "[f]irst in priority, then, in
any divorce reform was the elimination of the artificial fault
standard. That is the premise of the Family Law Act. '74
Specific evidence of this intent is present in a section of the
statute which provides that fault shall not be considered in
dissolution proceedings.75 The statute's specific provision that
evidence of misconduct is "improper and inadmissible" except
in child custody decisions is a clear directive that fault should
not be considered in awarding alimony.
An analysis of the factors considered in making alimony
awards before the Family Law Act was enacted is helpful to an
understanding of its effect. "It is true that comparative guilt of
the parties . . . [was] one of the considerations that [was] im-
portant in determining whether alimony should be granted
.... But once the determination whether alimony should be
granted was made, comparative guilt played no part in fixing
the amount or duration of the award. '76 The Family Law Act
provides for consideration of "factors which are just and equit-
able" in fixing the amount of the award.7 7 In any other context,
this could be read to include fault, but in light of the cases under
the prior law in California and the legislative intent, it is clear
that the phrase is not meant to include fault. Now, fault will not
or revocation shall include findings of fact and may be made re-
troactive to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order to
show cause to modify or revoke, or to any date subsequent thereto.
71. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Baldwin Supp. 1976).
72. MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 552.2 (Supp. 1977).
73. Note, In Re Marriage of Cary: Equitable Rights Granted to the Meretri-
cious Spouse, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 186, 195 (1974).
74. Id. at 195 n.54.
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West Supp. 1977): "In any pleadings or proceedings
for legal separation or dissolution of marriage under this part, including
dispositions and discovery proceedings, evidence of specific acts of mis-
conduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except where child custody is
in issue and such evidence is relevant to that issue."
76. Peterson v. Peterson, 30 Cal. App. 3d 477,480,106 Cal. Rptr. 482,484 (1973).
77. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a)(8) (West Supp. 1977). Subsection 8 was added to
the statute when it was amended in 1976.
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be considered in deciding whether to award alimony or in deter-
mining the amount of the award.7 8
Although fault is not considered in California in making
alimony awards, the factors which should be considered are
similar to those considered in other states. These include the
financial position of the parties, the wife's ability to work, her
needs and estate, the community property involved, the hus-
band's needs, and his ability to pay.
79
Attacks have been made on the California Family Law Act,
alleging that it is unconstitutional because of the lack of specific
guidelines for alimony and because of the large degree of dis-
cretion which is vested in the trial judge. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court in In re Marriage of Cosgrave8° affirmed the
constitutionality of the Act and said that under the old law
where fault was considered, there was an even greater degree of
discretion vested in the trial judge.81
Thus, abolishing fault in all levels of the divorce and alimony
proceedings has helped to achieve the purpose of the Act which
was to reduce the amount of court litigation involved in settling
the rights of the parties on the dissolution of a marriage.82
2. Iowa
As in California, Iowa's change to a no-fault divorce law was
interpreted to include a change in the alimony law. Under the
prior law in Iowa, the court was to determine an alimony order
"as should be right. s8 3 The case law supplemented the statute
and set out specific criteria for the court to consider. 84 Since
78. Peterson v. Peterson, 30 Cal. App. 3d 477, 106 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1973).
79. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974).
80. 27 Cal. App. 3d 424, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1972).
81. Id. at 433-34, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39.
82. In re Marriage of Potrino, 36 Cal. App. 3d 186, 111 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1973).
83. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.14, repealed, 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1266 § 22. The
present Iowa divorce law is found at IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp.
1977).
84. Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968):
A. PREMARITAL CRITERIA:
1. Social Position and living standards of each party.
2. Their respective ages.
3. Their respective mental or physical condition.
4. What each sacrificed or contributed, financially or other-
wise, to the marriage.
5. The training, education and abilities of each party.
B. POSTMARITAL CRITERIA:
1. Duration of the marriage.
2. Number of children, their respective ages, physical or
mental conditions, and relative parental as opposed to
financial needs.
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fault was important under the old law, the conduct of the
spouses, especially that of the guilty party, was to be considered.
The new alimony statute in Iowa included only a slight
change in the wording so that alimony is to be awarded "as shall
be justified. ' 85 The variation in the statute involved changing
the word "right" to "justified." In interpreting this minor
change, the Iowa Supreme Court could have held that fault was
still a factor, but it did not.86 The landmark case, In re Marriage
of Williams,87 interpreted the alimony law to be a reflection of
legislative intent to completely abolish fault considerations.88
With the exception of fault, the other criteria set forth in
Schantz v. Schantz89 would still be employed:9
[Tihe majority determined that, since the controlling legislative pur-
pose in enacting the no-fault dissolution procedure was to eliminate
fault grounds as a standard for granting the decree of dissolution, the
legislative purpose would be defeated unless the fault concept was
discarded as a factor for consideration in fixing financial obligations
and property dispositions. 91
A slight variation of the fault concept was considered in In re
Marriage of Harrington,92 in which the court did not consider
fault as such, but did consider the sacrifice of one spouse. This
could be viewed as rewarding one spouse for good conduct and
might be considered the reverse of a fault concept. Fault, or the
lack of it, may have been a consideration, but it may simply
3. Net worth of property acquired, contributions of each par-
ty thereto by labor or otherwise, net worth and present
income of each party.
4. Conduct of the spouses and particularly that of the guilty
party.
5. Present physical and mental health of each party.
6. Earning capacity of each party.
7. Life expectancy of each party.
8. Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care by either
spouse in furtherance of a happy marriage or in preserva-
tion of the marital relationship.
9. Present standards of living and ability of one party to pay
balanced against relative needs of the other.
10. Any other relevant factors which will aid in reaching a
fair and equitable determination as to respective rights
and obligations of the parties.
85. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1977).
86. In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 345.
89. 163 N.W.2d at 405.
90. In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 348 (Iowa 1972).
91. Note, Divorce-Alimony-Under Iowa's No-Fault Dissolution of Mar-
riage Procedure Evidence of the Conduct of the Parties Which tends to
Place Fault for the Marriage Breakdown Must be Disregarded as a Factor
in Awarding Property Settlement or Allowance of Alimony or Support
Money, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (1973).
92. 199 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972).
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have been an attempt to make an equal division of the marital
assets based on what each spouse contributed. The latter view
would be more consistent with the no-fault position adopted in
Iowa.
The change in the wording in the Iowa alimony law was
minor, but no-fault considerations were held to prevail in
alimony. The court could have found that there was no substan-
tive change in the alimony provision but did not because of its
perception of the legislative intent. The complete removal of
fault from the system would also eliminate the hypocrisy, bitter-
ness, and emotional stress involved in a system in which fault is
considered.9 3
3. Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon
The Oregon statute provides that fault may not be con-
sidered in property divisions or alimony awards.94 The statute
contains another section which refers to the factors which
should be considered in arriving at an alimony award.9 5 The
statute states that alimony must be just and equitable and that
the court may consider all relevant factors in arriving at its
award. If this section were read alone, one interpretation could
include allowing the consideration of fault in alimony. This
section, however, must be read in conjunction with the more
general introductory section which specifies that fault is not to
be considered. The Oregon State Court of Appeals has stated
that the rationale for no-fault is to put the parties in approxi-
mately the same financial position as if the marrige had not
93. In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1972).
94. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.036(3) (1977):
In dividing, awarding and distributing the real and personal
property (or both) of the parties (or either of them) between the
parties, or in making such property or any of it subject to a trust,
and in fixing the amount and duration of the contribution one
party is to make to the support of the other, the court shall not
consider the fault, if any, of either of the parties in causing grounds
for the annulment or dissolution of the marriage or for separation.
95. Id. § 107.105(1):
[The court may provide]
(c) for the support of a party ... such amount of money for
such period of time as it may be just and equitable for the other
party to contribute .... In making such support order, the court
shall consider the following matters:
(A) The duration of the marriage;
(B) The ages of the parties;
(C) Their health and condition;
(D) Their work experience and earning capacities;
(E) Their financial conditions, resources and property rights;
(I) Such other matters as the court shall deem relevant.
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been dissolved.9 6 Since fault was eliminated from consideration
by statute, the Oregon courts have awarded alimony on the
basis of other factors enumerated in the statute.97
In Colorado and Arizona, the legislatures explicitly abol-
ished fault considerations from alimony: "The maintenance or-
der shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the
court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and
after considering all relevant factors ..... 8 In determining
alimony awards under these statutes, the focus is on the ac-
cumulation of assets and all other factors.99 In Carlson v. Carl-
son,00 the Colorado Supreme Court said it would consider the
conduct of the parties, but in view of the statutory language, this
is most likely to be interpreted to mean conduct with regard to
financial contributions. The no-fault-in-alimony rule in Colo-
rado and Arizona is a matter of statutory decree.
IV. FAULT AND ALIMONY IN NEBRASKA
The statutes discussed thus far have presented a spectrum
ranging from fault to no-fault systems. In analyzing the Nebras-
ka situation, it is most important to consider the other states in
which no-fault divorce laws were passed with no corresponding
change in the alimony statutes. The statutes in other states were
interpreted in various ways when the courts tried to discern the
legislature's intent. Thus, statutes which on their face appear to
be similar, have had widely differing interpretations.
The changes which occurred in the Nebraska statutes with
the advent of no-fault divorce are similar to those which oc-
curred in the statutes of Iowa and Michigan. In those states, the
divorce statutes were changed drastically, but there was no real
mention in the statute of what effect this would have on the
alimony law. Other state courts have recognized this problem
and settled it in one way or another, but Nebraska has never
squarely faced the issue. This portion of the comment will focus
on the factors which were considered for alimony under the
prior law, and then focus on the new statute and the correspond-
ing case law to determine whether or not fault is still a factor to
be considered in alimony awards.
96. Wirthlin v. Wirthlin, 19 Or. App. 256, 527 P.2d 147 (1974).
97. Dietz v. Dietz, 271 Or. 445,533 P.2d 783 (1975); In re Marriage of Watrous, 23
Or. App. 241, 541 P.2d 1082 (1975); In re Marriage of Libby, 23 Or. App. 223,
541 P.2d 1077 (1975); In re Marriage of Fery, 20 Or. App. 581, 532 P.2d
1131 (1975); In re Marriage of Balin, 19 Or. App. 529, 528 P.2d 128 (1974).
98. ARIZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (West 1976); COLO. REV STAT. § 14-10-114
(1973).
99. Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331, 411 P.2d 240 (1966).
100. 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972).
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A. Alimony Awards Under the Prior Law
The former Nebraska statute on alimony provided for an
award which was "just and reasonable," considering the ability
of the husband to support the wife, the character and situation
of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.1 1 The
circumstances to be considered included fault; alimony was not
to be awarded to an adulterous spouse.10 2 The case law filled in
the meaning of the statutory language and added factors similar
to those considered by other state courts: the age and earning
abilities of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the conduct
of the parties during the marriage, the standard of living, the
health and physical condition of the parties, the financial cir-
cumstances and any other relevant factors. 03
Most Nebraska cases focused on these factors but also gave
consideration to the fault factor. In Prosser v. Prosser,1 4 the
court considered the husband's earnings and his ability to pay
and said that alimony should not be awarded out of sympathy
for the wife or as a penalty for the husband's misconduct. The
court, however, seemed to emphasize the fault of the husband,
recognizing that he treated the marriage as a matter of conveni-
ence. In the past it has been considered important in Nebraska
to examine the husband's fault, his conduct, and whether his
acts brought about the separation.0 5 For example, where the
husband was habitually drunk and used his wife's money to pay
his own debts, fault was considered; the alimony exceeded the
value of the husband's assets.10 6 Even though the result could be
viewed in terms of economic equity, the court indicated that
fault was a material element in alimony.
Where the wife was deemed to be at fault in the breakdown
of the marriage, her fault did not seem to be given as much
weight as the husband's. For example, where both spouses were
at fault, the court played down the wife's alleged adultery and
said the husband had condoned her acts. The court also empha-
sized the husband's abuse of the wife and subsequently in-
creased her alimony. 0 7 The lack of emphasis on the fault of the
101. Law of March 19, 1949, ch. 127, 1949 Neb. Laws 335 (codified at NEB. REv.
STAT. § 42-318(1) (1949); repealed 1972).
102. Id.
103. Mandelberg v. Mandelberg, 187 Neb. 844, 195 N.W.2d 148 (1972).
104. 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953).
105. Sanchez v. Sanchez, 186 Neb. 427, 183 N.W.2d 743 (1971); Fry v. Fry, 186
Neb. 521, 184 N.W.2d 636 (1971); Peterson v. Peterson, 152 Neb. 571, 41
N.W.2d 847 (1966).
106. Trimble v. Trimble, 180 Neb. 647, 144 N.W.2d 171 (1966).
107. Schwark v. Schwark, 175 Neb. 560, 122 N.W.2d 489 (1963); Eno v. Eno, 159
Neb. 1, 65 N.W.2d 145 (1954).
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wife is supported by the fact that even if the wife alone were at
fault, she could still be awarded alimony except where the di-
vorce was granted to the husband on the ground of the wife's
adultery. 0 8 This may result from the fact that alimony has its
basis in the husband's duty to support.0 9 The rationale for em-
phasizing the husband's fault, while playing down that of the
wife, could be that the husband is being punished or that the
wife should be given added compensation for the fact that the
husband caused the divorce.
Under prior case law the wife's contributions to the marriage
were usually considered and given great weight. The cases
varied on how much weight should be given to fault in the
determination of the alimony award but it is clear that fault was
definitely a factor in alimony decisions.
B. Alimony Awards Under the New Law
The new alimony law"0 provides, as did the prior law, that
alimony must be reasonable and that the circumstances of the
parties should be considered. The language of the new statute is
somewhat more specific in that it mentions several factors to be
considered, including the ability of the supported spouse to
work and the duration of the marriage. The major change in the
law dealt with the adoption of a no-fault standard as the basis
for divorce."' The alimony law did not state whether fault was
specifically abolished. The fact that fault is not mentioned in the
alimony statute is not conclusive proof that fault is not to be
108. Malone v. Malone, 163 Neb. 517, 80 N.W.2d 294 (1957).
109. Ristow v. Ristow, 152 Neb. 615, 41 N.W.2d 924 (1950).
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1976):
When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order
payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of
property as may be reasonable, having regard for the circum-
stances of the parties, duration of the marriage, a history of the
contributions to the marriage by each party, including contribu-
tions to the care and education of the children, and interruption of
p~rsonal careers or educational opportunities, and the ability of the
supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfer-
ing with the interests of any minor children in the custody of such
party. Reasonable security for payment may be required by the
court. Unless amounts have accrued prior to the date of service of
process on a petition to modify, orders for alimony may be mod-
ified or revoked for good cause shown, but when alimony is not
allowed in the original decree dissolving a marriage, such decree
may not be modified to award alimony. Except as otherwise agreed
by the parties in writing or by order of the court, alimony orders
shall terminate upon the death of either party or the remarriage of
the recipient.
(Note that this statute does not bar an adulterous wife from receiving
alimony as did the old law.)
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-361 (Reissue 1974).
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considered because the old law did not specifically mention it
either.
There was no clear-cut legislative history that the Nebraska
Supreme Court could look to as a guideline for determining
legislative intent. 112 Given the legislative scheme, the supreme
court could have followed Iowa's lead and held that the no-fault
intent of the statutory scheme prevailed. 113 The alternative was
to follow the Kentucky1 4 and Michigan1 15 cases which held that
since the alimony statute was not specifically changed, fault
could still be considered.
The first Nebra~ka case which dealt with fault and alimony
under the new statute was Magruder v. Magruder."6 Unfortu-
nately, the court did not come to a definitive conclusion in that
case and did not specifically state whether fault was to be con-
sidered in making alimony awards. The court said that the wife
did not want a divorce and that the husband had stated that
other women looked good to him; 117 however, the relationship
between these "fault" factors and alimony was not discussed.
The fact that the wife had put the husband through school was
mentioned. It is not clear, though, whether the court considered
the husband's fault as well as the fact that the wife should have
received a return on her contribution to the assets of the mar-
riage.
The dissent in Magruder accused the majority of silently
applying punitive considerations because of the unusually large
amount awarded. The dissent claimed that the award, which
provided for alimony of $833.33 per month for ten years and two
months, was unconscionable." 8 Under the new statute, the dis-
sent felt that fault should not be a factor. While the wife should
be compensated for her investment in the marriage, her ability
to work should also be a factor considered. One commentator
has agreed with the dissent's view of the majority decision in
Magruder and said that as a result of the husband's fault, the
wife has been given "tort-like awards,. . . best explained in
terms of punishment." 119 Certainly it is possible to view Magrud-
112. Note, Family Law-Marriage Dissolution-First Decision by Nebraska
Supreme Court Under Nebraska's New No-Fault Marriage Dissolution
Statutes Leaves Uncertain the Question of Whether Fault is to be Ex-
cluded From the Post-Dissolution Determinations of Alimony and Prop-
erty Settlement, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 369 n.18 (1974).
113. In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
114. Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973).,
115. Kretzschmor v. Kretzschmor, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973).
116. 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
117. Id. at 576, 209 N.W.2d at 587.
118. Id. at 578, 209 N.W.2d at 588 (White, J., dissenting).
119. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 336 (1977).
ALIMONY AND NO-FAULT DIVORCE
er as being decided on fault principles even though they were
not specifically articulated. However, it is still possible to read
the case as a no-fault alimony decision.
The cases subsequent to Magruder have not specifically
settled the issue and no definitive statement by the Nebraska
Supreme Court has been articulated, although it does appear
that in most cases a no-fault principle has been applied.12 0 How-
ever, there are two cases under the new Nebraska law which
could be interpreted to be fault oriented-Seybold v. Seybold' 2'
and Reisig v. Reisig.122 In Seybold the court recognized that the
wife had planned to leave home several years before the divorce
and that she even had notes regarding her prospective divorce.
As a result, it appears that the court considered the wife's acts in
the alimony award. In Reisig, the husband had not contributed
to, and had even depleted, the marital assets. The award, there-
fore, was not really based on marital fault but was intended as
financial compensation-the husband was required to replace
through alimony what he had taken from the assets.
In 1978 the court decided Theye v. Theye. 123 The majority
opinion in Theye stated that the record "establishe[d] that
unilateral acts of the petitioner were responsible for the irre-
trievable breakdown of the marriage and that the respondent
made all reasonable efforts to save the marriage. Under the
facts of this case we find that the grant of alimony to petitioner
was excessive.1' 24 By including this statement, the majority
opinion implied that fault had been considered in making the
alimony award. One of the two concurring opinions in Theye
also implied that fault should be taken into consideration in
awarding alimony.1 25 This concurrence, which expressed the
view of two of the justices, when read in conjunction with the
120. Lockard v. Lockard, 193 Neb. 400, 227 N.W.2d 581 (1975); Barnes v. Barnes,
192 Neb. 295, 220 N.W.2d 22 (1974).
121. 191 Neb. 480, 216 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
122. 191 Neb. 612, 216 N.W.2d 731 (1974).
123. 200 Neb. 206, 263 N.W.2d 92 (1978).
124. Id. at 208, 263 N.W.2d at 94.
125. In making an award of alimony and a division of property the court
should consider more than just the circumstances of the parties at
the time of the dissolution of the marriage. Not only the length of
the marriage but the property of the parties at the time of the
marriage, the income during the marriage, and how it was spent
are important factors which should be considered. It would be
totally unrealistic to disregard the circumstances of the parties
during the marriage and assume that a fair and just division of
property could be made without regard to what happened during
the marriage.
Id. at 209, 263 N.W.2d at 95 (Boslaugh, J., concurring; joined by Spencer, J.)
(emphasis added).
814 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 3 (1978)
majority opinion indicates that three of the justices 126 on the
court are of the opinion that fault should be taken into con-
sideration. However, the other concurring opinion, which ex-
pressed the view of four of the justices,127 indicated that fault
should not be considered when awarding alimony:
[We] agree with the majority in the result. [We] disagree with any
implications in the opinion that the result somehow follows a deter-
mination of responsibility for the initial breakdown of the marriage.
The award of alimony and the division of property are determined by
the circumstances of the parties at the time of dissolution of the
marriage, the length of the marriage, the health, relative earning pow-
er, and education of the parties, and whether there are unemancipated
children.... No case has said that the granting, denial, or reduction
of alimony nor the division of property are to be considered punitive.
[we] would not engraft any such provision on the law of this state.128
Although this concurrence stated that fault should not be con-
sidered, it did not articulate why it agreed with the majority that
the alimony award should be reduced. It, therefore, appears
that there is a four-three split on the court, the majority being of
the opinion that fault should not be considered when awarding
alimony.
In awarding alimony most Nebraska cases have tried to
make a fairly equal division of the marital assets,129 looked at
the contribution 130 or lack of contribution' 31 by both parties to
the assets, and at the ability of each to work,132 all without
regard to fault. In justifying its no-fault position, the court has
stated that the primary reason for alimony is to provide sup-
port.3 3 The statutes were primarily designed to protect women
and in this regard the court should look at the ability of each
party to work. A marriage does not necessarily create a lifetime
lien on the husband for support.1 34 The focus should be on the
support and fairness aspects of alimony.
126. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Clinton. The concurring
opinion was authored by Justice Boslaugh and was joined by Justice
Spencer.
127. This concurrence was authored by Justice White. Chief Justice White and
Justices McCown and Brodkey joined in the concurrence.
128. 200 Neb. at 209, 263 N.W.2d at 94 (White, J., concurring in the result; joined
by White, C.J., and McCown and Brodkey, J.J.).
129. Bodberg v. Bodberg, 193 Neb. 844, 229 N.W.2d 552 (1975); Young v. Young,
192 Neb. 735, 224 N.W.2d 361 (1974).
130. Sommers v. Sommers, 191 Neb. 361, 215 N.W.2d 84 (1974).
131. Tavlin v. Tavlin, 194 Neb. 98, 230 N.W.2d 108 (1975).
132. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975); Tuttle v. Tuttle, 193
Neb. 397, 227 N.W.2d 27 (1975); Braeman v. Braeman, 192 Neb. 510, 222
N.W.2d 811 (1975); Peery v. Peery, 191 Neb. 782, 217 N.W.2d 837 (1974);
Casselman v. Casselman, 191 Neb. 138, 214 N.W.2d 278 (1974); Albrecht v.
Albrecht, 190 Neb. 393, 208 N.W.2d 669 (1973).
133. Essex v. Essex, 195 Neb. 385, 238 N.W.2d 235 (1976).
134. Buchholz v. Buchholz, 197 Neb. 180, 248 N.W.2d 21 (1976).
ALIMONY AND NO-FAULT DIVORCE
The Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly said that it will
not disturb an award of alimony unless it is clearly unfair.135 In
most cases, the court has found the awards to be reasonable
even if high.136 Only occasionally have awards been modified.13 7
If fault were still to be considered, it would be a matter for the
discretion of the trial judge and it would be more difficult for
the reviewing court to hold that an award was unfair.
V. CONCLUSION
The new law in Nebraska has not specifically stated that
alimony is no-fault but a review of the cases indicates that with
one exception 138 the cases have not considered fault as a factor
in awarding alimony. Instead, the focus has been on the finan-
cial equities of the situation. It would appear that the Nebraska
Supreme Court has followed the lead taken by the Iowa and
California courts which hold that no-fault principles should
prevail in alimony.
The basic premise behind alimony is to provide adequate
support for the wife. It is not designed as punishment for a
spouse who has been at fault. The goal of alimony is to achieve a
just and equitable distribution of the assets so that each spouse
will be capable of maintaining a standard of living similar to
that enjoyed during the marriage. The emphasis should be on
economic equity between the spouses after considering each
spouse's assets and financial situation.
The question is whether a determination of fault is necessary
to arrive at an equitable and just alimony award. With the in-
troduction of fault as a factor, moral decisions are usually in-
volved which may unfairly overshadow the economic realities
of the situation. Further, the discretion of the trial judge is
increased when fault is considered and an award may be based
unduly on the personal morals of the judge.
Removing fault from the determination of the alimony
award eliminates'the fault finding process and would help re-
duce the resultant hostility involved in such a system. After
135. Jackson v. Jackson, 197 Neb. 27, 246 N.W.2d 722 (1976); Van Bloom v. Van
Bloom, 196 Neb. 792, 246 N.W.2d 588 (1976); Abbott v. Abbott, 196 Neb. 97,
241 N.W.2d 527 (1976).
136. Lynch v. Lynch, 195 Neb. 804, 241 N.W.2d 123 (1976); Magruder v. Magrud-
er, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
137. Mangum v. Mangum, 197 Neb. 350, 249 N.W.2d 207 (1977); Howard v. How-
ard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976).
138. Seybold v. Seybold, 191 Neb. 480, 216 N.W.2d 179 (1974). Another exception
might be Theye v. Theye, 200 Neb. 206,263 N.W.2d 92 (1978). See notes 123-
28 and accompanying text supra.
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viewing the policy reasons behind removing fault as a con-
sideration in alimony awards, it is apparent that fault need not
be considered to achieve a just award and that the Nebraska
court has arrived at the best result by no longer considering
fault in alimony awards.
Elaine G. Rollins '78
